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ELECTION LAW BEHIND A VEIL OF IGNORANCE 
Chad Flanders
*
 
Abstract 
Election law struggles with the question of neutrality, not only with its 
possibility—can election rules truly be neutral between parties?—but also 
with its definition. What does it mean for election laws to be ―neutral‖? 
This Article examines one form of election law neutrality, found in what it 
terms ―veil of ignorance rules.‖ Such rules are formed in circumstances 
where neither party knows which rule will benefit its candidates in future 
elections.  
This Article considers the existence of veil of ignorance rules in two 
recent election law controversies: the rule that write-in ballots must be 
spelled correctly (in the Lisa Murkowski Senate race in Alaska), and the 
rule that a candidate must be a ―resident‖ of the city in which he plans to 
run for mayor (Rahm Emanuel‘s candidacy for Mayor of Chicago). Both 
rules can plausibly lay claim to being formed in conditions where neither 
party could know, ex ante, which rule would benefit its own candidates.  
Veil of ignorance rules are interesting in their own right, but they also 
suggest a possible modification in what Professor Rick Hasen has recently 
dubbed ―the democracy canon.‖ The canon suggests that ambiguous 
election law rules should be read in a way that maximizes voter 
enfranchisement and voter choice. But if there are some rules that are 
neutral, because formed behind a veil of ignorance, they may deserve a 
type of deference not due to rules that were formed with an eye toward 
partisan advantage—even if those rules serve to limit voter participation.  
Moreover, to the extent that the rules in the Murkowski and Emmanuel 
cases were neutral, upsetting them means upsetting a prior, legitimate, 
democratic decision. Voter participation and voter choice (that is, popular 
democracy) are not the only hallmarks of democratic legitimacy. 
Legislative decisions can also be democratic. The democracy canon only 
upholds one conception of democratic legitimacy. It is not, I conclude, the 
only one that can or should guide us in deciding close election law cases. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Ph.D., University of 
Chicago; J.D., Yale Law School. This Article fulfills some of the promissory notes made in my two 
Alaska Law Review pieces, Spelling Murkowski: The Next Act, A Reply to Fishkin and Levitt, 28 
ALASKA L. REV. 49 (2011) and How Do You Spell M-U-R-K-O-W-S-K-I? Part I: The Question of 
Voter Assistance, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2011). Thanks to Christopher Jones and Sam Dickhut for 
extremely helpful and timely research assistance, and for comments on a previous draft. William 
Baude, Joshua Douglas, Monica Eppinger, Rick Hasen, James Lindgren, Dan Markel, Efthimi 
Parasides, and Jeff Redding, and all commented on an early draft; I am very grateful to all of them. 
All mistakes are my own. 
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“Second—and more relevant for our purposes—legislatures, in 
contrast to courts and executive officials, must enact their rules in advance 
of any particular controversy. A legislative code is enacted behind a veil of 
ignorance; no one knows (for sure) which rules will benefit which 
candidates.
1” 
INTRODUCTION 
 Consider the following two recent election law litigation scenarios. In 
the first, an incumbent Senator, after losing her party‘s senatorial primary, 
decides to run as a write-in candidate. The race is hard-fought, and close, 
but it appears that her write-in candidacy will be a success. However, her 
opponent (who won the party‘s primary race) challenges many of the write-
in ballots that have been cast, arguing that they do not exactly spell the 
name of the candidate—who, it turns out, has a notoriously tricky name to 
spell. The opponent relies on a strict reading of an election statute that 
seems to require the correct spelling of the write-in candidate‘s name. The 
head of the Division of Elections and, eventually, the state‘s supreme 
court, opt for a more generous ―intent of the voter‖ standard in reading the 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Michael McConnell, Two-and-a-Half-Cheers for Bush v. Gore, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 103 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). 
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ballots. The write-in candidate wins.
2
 
In the second scenario, after working—and living—in Washington, 
D.C., for over a year, the President‘s chief of staff decides to run for mayor 
in his hometown of Chicago. Immediately, several interested parties file a 
lawsuit, alleging that the former chief of staff has not been a ―resident‖ of 
the city of Chicago for long enough, or recently enough, to qualify as an 
eligible mayoral candidate. The former chief of staff objects, saying that he 
has lived in Chicago for most of his life and still owns a house in the area. 
The lawsuit is eventually decided in his favor, and he goes on to win the 
mayoral race in a rout.
3
 
 These cases both testify to why election law and, more specifically, the 
interpretation of election statutes and regulations is such an exciting field: 
the ―right‖ interpretation of election statutes can have momentous 
consequences. If the rules for counting write-in ballots are read one way, 
the candidate will lose hundreds, or even thousands, of votes, and may 
ultimately lose the election. If the rules are read another way, the candidate 
cruises to a comfortable victory. Or, if the candidate is found not to be a 
resident, his promising candidacy is nipped in the bud. But if he can run, 
his chances look good; indeed, his election is virtually guaranteed. 
 If these examples testify to the high stakes in interpreting election 
statutes and regulations, they likewise attest to the dangers. In a word, the 
danger is that the interpretations we bring to bear will be inevitably and 
unacceptably partisan; we will tend to favor the interpretation that will 
lead to victory for our candidate, or our party, or our side. Election law 
does not, and cannot, exist in a partisan vacuum. Interpretations have 
consequences, and interpreters will be hard-pressed not to decide, or 
appear to decide, in light of those consequences. The immediate and harsh 
academic reaction to the decision in Bush v. Gore may offer the best 
example of the perils of election law interpretation.
4
 It became hard to 
separate the criticism that the decision was wrong from the criticism that 
the decision was partisan, and at times, the two criticisms seemed to meld 
together—the decision was wrong precisely because it was partisan. 
 Yet it now seems that courts are called upon to interpret election 
statutes with increasing regularity,
5
 and they must do so in a way that 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867 (Alaska 2010). 
 3. See Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051 (Ill. 2011). 
 4. See, e.g., BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) 
(containing essays demonstrating the harsh response to Bush v. Gore by many legal scholars); Jack 
M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1407 
(2001) (―It is no secret that the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore has shaken the faith of 
many legal academics in the Supreme Court and in the system of judicial review.‖).  
 5. Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 29 (2007) 
(providing statistics on the rise of election law litigation); see also Chad Flanders, Election Law: 
Too Big To Fail?, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 775 (2012) (discussion of growth of election law on the 
ground and as a subject of academic study). 
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avoids partisanship. Judges may be put in what appears to be an impossible 
position: either way they rule, they risk accusations of partisanship because 
their decisions will inevitably have partisan consequences. What is to be 
done? Recently, Professor Richard Hasen has proposed that judges 
deciding close election law cases should have recourse to the ―Democracy 
Canon‖: when interpreting an ambiguous statute, judges should interpret 
that statute in favor of giving the greatest leeway to the voter.
6
 In cases of 
ballot counting, Hasen has argued, this means construing statutes in a way 
that gives effect to the voter‘s intent, so that votes are not thrown away on 
technicalities.
7
 In cases of candidate eligibility, close cases should be 
resolved in favor of letting the candidate run—let the voters, not the courts, 
decide whether the candidate should be elected.
8
 Professor Hasen‘s 
important article has deservedly garnered much in the way of scholarly 
attention.
9
 In other recent popular works, Hasen has suggested that the 
Democracy Canon could have been put to good use in the two cases 
sketched above; it is arguable that it was, in fact, used in one case.
10
  
 While there is much to be said for the Democracy Canon, it has some 
important limitations. First, the canon tends to give us a one-size-fits-all 
way of understanding election statutes. It says: if an election rule is 
ambiguous, read it in favor of giving greater choice to voters, or to 
effectuating voter intent. But there may be important differences between 
types of election law rules. Some of these differences involve the content 
of the rules. Other differences—with which this Article is chiefly 
concerned—involve how the rules were formed. Rules that have been 
formed in a nonpartisan way—even if they are somewhat vague or 
ambiguous, and even if they might serve to deny voters choice in some 
instances—may have a greater claim to deference than do rules that are 
partisan in their aim or origin. Such nonpartisan rules are presumptively 
fair between the parties, and ought to be followed, even if the effect of 
these rules may be to limit some voter choice.  
 Second, and relatedly, when the court steps in and alters an election 
rule, it is not always acting in a democracy-reinforcing way. Hasen‘s canon 
fits into the well-known tradition that courts can intervene, and do so 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 71 (2009). 
 7. Id. at 83. 
 8. Id. at 84. 
 9. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
1051 (2010) (discussing the problems with the Democracy Canon);  Edward B. Foley, How Fair 
Can Be Faster: The Lessons of Coleman v. Franken, 10 ELECTION L.J. 187 (2011). 
 10.  Richard L. Hasen, Alaska’s Big Spelling Test, SLATE (Nov. 11, 2010, 6:04 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/11/alaskas_big_spelling _tes 
t.html [hereinafter Hasen, Alaska]; Richard L. Hasen, Let Rahm Run!, SLATE (Jan. 24, 2011, 6:20 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/01/let_rahm_run.html 
[hereinafter Hasen, Rahm]. 
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legitimately, when their decisions uphold the political process.
11
 But there 
is another, equally powerful tradition, which says that courts can upset the 
democratic decision making process when they intervene and construe 
statutes in a way not necessarily intended by the legislature.
12
 Deciding 
which of these two traditions to favor when interpreting statutes means 
making the kind of distinction outlined in the previous paragraph. When 
election statutes have been drafted in a nonpartisan way, the court should 
respect the outcome of the democratic legislative process. When those 
rules are not neutral, the case for the court to read the statute in a way that 
opens the political process to voters becomes stronger—even if this means 
reading the statute contrary to its possible plain meaning. 
 This Article points to and defines a narrow class of election law rules, 
which it calls ―veil of ignorance rules.‖ Sometimes, legislatures cannot 
manipulate election rules to favor their own party or candidate because 
they make these rules without knowing whether the rules will help or harm 
their party or candidate. Rules about correct spellings of last names, or 
residency requirements, are of this type: when legislatures make these 
rules, they do not know whether their candidate will have an easy- or 
difficult-to-spell name, nor whether their candidate will be a longtime 
resident of the state or city, or will have just moved there.  
In the phrase I will use (borrowing from philosopher John Rawls) 
legislatures make these rules ―behind a veil of ignorance,‖ because they are 
ignorant of whether the rule will benefit their candidate, when he actually 
runs.
13
 Veil of ignorance rules are special because they are presumptively 
neutral—the parties, because they cannot know whether the rule will help 
them, will focus on the merits of the rule in making it, rather than on 
securing any partisan advantage. Such rules ought to receive deference, 
even if courts disagree with them on policy grounds. 
 This Article is divided into three parts. Part I outlines the ways in 
which laws might be neutral or not neutral. Borrowing from John Rawls 
and Herbert Wechsler, it argues that laws should ideally be neutral in aim, 
but that it is very difficult to see how they can be neutral in effect.
14
 In the 
                                                                                                                     
 11. The classic text is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980). More recently, Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes have taken up 
the subject. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan 
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).  
 12. At one extreme is the work of law professor and former judge Robert Bork. See, e.g, 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). But there are 
milder and even progressive versions as well. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: 
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A 
Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2006) 
(reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2005)).  
 13. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971). 
 14. See infra Part I. 
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election law context, this means that legitimate rules would not necessarily 
aim to favor either party, even though the rules we have in place may 
often—perhaps even always—have the effect of helping one party or 
another. 
 While Part I explores the meaning of neutrality, Part II gets down to 
examining particular cases. In particular, it argues that the recent 
Murkowski and Emanuel cases are examples of regulations that, while 
having partisan effects, were not drafted with partisan aims. Indeed, 
borrowing from John Rawls (and Professor Adrian Vermeule in the legal 
context), the rules regarding ballot counting in the Alaska senatorial race 
and residency requirements in the Chicago mayoral race were drafted 
behind a de facto ―veil of ignorance.‖15 In these circumstances especially, 
there is little reason to suspect any partisan aim behind the legislation. Part 
III uses the conclusions of Part II to assess the importance and the 
relevance of the ―Democracy Canon‖ in different election law contexts. 
Hasen relies on the Democracy Canon to justify his approach to the 
Murkowski and Emanuel cases—regarding Murkowski, let the voter intent 
standard govern; in the latter case, let Rahm Emanuel run. But in both 
cases, this Article suggests that the correct reading of the statute was a 
much closer call. There are credible arguments that the statutes, plainly 
read, supported a narrower interpretation: throw out the misspelled ballots, 
and keep Emanuel from running. But even if they did not support this 
narrower interpretation, and the statutes were ambiguous, there is a good 
reason not to read them expansively: the statutes were drafted behind a veil 
of ignorance and have a good claim to being neutral ―rules of the game.‖ 
This, in turn, moves me to qualify the Democracy Canon: there are some 
cases of ambiguous statutes where the canon should not be used, and 
something like the opposite of the Democracy Canon should be our 
guiding principle.  The Democracy Canon, in other words, need not be our 
―default‖ setting when it comes to interpreting election law rules.    
 But this leads me to a final point. To the extent that the rules in the 
Murkowski and Emanuel cases were neutral, upsetting them means 
upsetting a prior, legitimate, democratic decision. Voter participation—that 
is, popular democracy—is not the only hallmark of democratic decision 
making. Legislative decisions can also be democratic. The Democracy 
Canon only upholds one conception of democratic legitimacy. It is not the 
only one that should guide us in deciding close election law cases.  
I.  VARIETIES OF NEUTRALITY IN POLITICAL THEORY AND ELECTION LAW 
The very idea of neutrality has repeatedly been contested—some deny 
that it even exists, while others call it a mere mask for partisan agendas.
16
 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE‘S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND ITS A GOOD 
THING, TOO 297 (1994).  
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Even neutrality might not be truly ―neutral.‖ But if neutrality were not a 
valid and useful concept, we might wonder why it still keeps popping up, 
when so much time and effort has gone into debunking it. As Professor 
Andrew Koppelman and others have argued, the idea of neutrality seems to 
capture something important, and seems to be almost indispensable, even 
if sometimes elusive.
17
 We are drawn to the idea that decisions should be 
made on an impartial basis, without bias toward one side or interest over 
another.
18
 That is the bare idea of neutrality, and it is hard to gainsay that 
there is at least something there. This is why we keep coming back to 
neutrality. 
But if the bare idea of neutrality is easy enough to grasp, there is still 
some difficulty in defining exactly what neutrality is and how the concept 
should be applied. In thinking about how to characterize neutrality and its 
importance in the election law context, it is useful to outline two ways we 
might interpret the concept. First, we might think that a neutral policy is 
one that is neutral in its aim. Second, we might think that a neutral policy 
is one that is neutral in its effects. John Rawls has given an influential 
exposition of this difference, and I heavily rely on his work here.
19
 
 Neutrality of aim is one that should be familiar to legal scholars, for 
something very near to it lies at the basis of Herbert Wechsler‘s influential 
defense of neutral principles in constitutional law adjudication.
20
 Legal 
decisions, to be principled, cannot rest on the fact that a judge favors a 
particular result over another—based on the identities of the parties, for 
example.
21
 Courts must instead abstract from particular cases and find a 
rule that will cover more than one case—in other words, one that is neutral 
across cases. Thus, in deciding a free speech case, a judge cannot decide 
that one side should prevail because he favors its particular message—he 
likes what the communists say, for instance, but not what the abortion 
protestors say. Rather, courts must seek a neutral standard—one that is not 
based on the content of the speech, but on other, neutral characteristics (for 
example, whether the speech creates an imminent risk of lawless action). It 
may happen that this standard tends to favor one group in the long run, but 
the aim of the standard is to decide cases in a way that favors neither group 
in the abstract.
22
  
                                                                                                                     
 17. Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POL. 633, 636 (2004). I have 
quarreled with Professor Koppelman‘s use of neutrality in other contexts; in election law, however, 
the idea is quite useful. See Chad Flanders, Can We Please Stop Talking About Neutrality? 
Koppelman Between Scalia and Rawls, PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  
 18. Koppelman, supra note 17. 
 19. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 192–94 (1993).  
 20. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1959).  
 21. Id. at 15. 
 22. See generally Wechsler, supra note 20 (arguing that courts deciding constitutional cases 
should base their decisions on reasoning and analysis that transcend the immediate result). 
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 Rawls says something similar, or at least not opposed to Wechsler, in 
his articulation of neutrality of aim. In a politically liberal society, Rawls 
argues, a statute should not aim to favor any one ―comprehensive 
doctrine,‖ or way of looking at the good life.23 This indeed is what it means 
for the society to be politically liberal in Rawls‘s sense of the term: it does 
not give preference to one ideal of life‘s goals over another. Rawls does 
distinguish between neutrality of aim and what he calls procedural justice, 
yet this contrast only serves to highlight the essence of neutrality of aim.
24
 
Rawls says that his theory of justice is not procedurally neutral, because the 
values justice represents are more than simply the values of consistency, 
generality, and impartiality.
25
 In this respect, Rawls wants to separate his 
idea of neutrality of aim from Wechsler‘s more procedurally oriented 
notion of neutrality.
26
  
 But this seems to be a distinction that ultimately does not make that 
much of a difference. Justice will require that certain values be satisfied, 
and not merely that some procedures be followed. We protect people‘s 
right to free speech, or their right to a basic minimum income. Still, once 
we have established that these are the values that we as a society want to 
uphold, we must adjudicate and legislate these values in a neutral way—
one that does not favor any one conception of the good life over another.  
 And indeed, here Wechsler is not much different. There are certain 
constitutional values we endorse, Wechsler says, but these values must be 
applied in a neutral way. Even Wechsler, that is, does not ground his 
decision making procedure merely in the ideas of consistency, generality, 
and impartiality.
27
 The fact that there are some substantive values in our 
constitutional order does not make neutrality irrelevant. It just specifies the 
values about which we have to be neutral. Once we say, for instance, that 
free speech is a value, we are obliged to decide free speech cases on a 
neutral basis. And for Rawls and Wechsler, as long as our aim is neutral, 
we have satisfied the requirements of neutrality. 
 At the same time, Rawls acknowledges the existence of another species 
of neutrality, one that he ultimately rejects: neutrality of effect.
28
 Under this 
conception of neutrality, it is not enough that policies or decisions are 
made on neutral grounds; the substantive result of those decisions must be 
neutral.
29
 On the Rawlsian account, then, neutrality of effect would mean 
that no policy could in fact benefit one group over another, even if the 
principle that was used to ground the policy did not explicitly, or 
                                                                                                                     
 23. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 190. 
 24. Id. at 191–94; see also CHARLES LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 44 (1987). 
 25. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 191–92. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Wechsler, supra note 20, at 18–19. 
 28. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 193–94. 
 29. Id. at 193.  
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implicitly, intend that one group be favored.  
 Rawls says that neutrality of effect is an impossible goal, and so we 
should not pursue it.
30
 As he writes: 
[I]t is surely impossible for the basic structure of a just 
constitutional regime not to have important effects and 
influences as to which comprehensive doctrines endure and 
gain adherence over time; and it is futile to try to counteract 
these effects and influences, or even to ascertain for political 
purposes how deep and pervasive they are.
31
  
Rawls claims this is simply an insight of commonsense political 
sociology.
32
  
So here, at a very rough approximation, we have two ideals of 
neutrality: one that focuses on the purpose or aim of the law or decision, 
and one that looks at the effects of the law or decision. But can such ideas 
of neutrality be applied to election law? This Article argues that they can. It 
may be easier to see how neutrality of effect might simply be an impossible 
dream in politics: any rule will have effects that may benefit one party or 
another.
33
 Consider again the Murkowski and Emanuel cases, where 
deciding either way would be to the benefit of one candidate and to the 
detriment of the other. There was simply no way to decide that would not 
result in one party benefiting, and the other hurting. Even if the court had 
decided not to intervene, leaving the status quo in both cases would have 
benefited one party, and hurt the other. There is no hope for neutrality of 
effect in election law cases.
34
 
But we might still expect that our election law rules and decisions at 
least aim to be neutral.
35
 That is, our rules in election law should not be 
such that they deliberately set out to stack the deck in favor of one party or 
one candidate. That seems a reasonable goal. But we might also wonder 
whether it can ever be achieved. Won‘t parties always try to manipulate the 
process to their own advantage? Of course they will, and in these cases, we 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Id. But see Chad W. Flanders, Rawls and the Claims of Culture (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author).  
 31. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 193. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Nathan Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial 
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 674 (2002); see also 
R. George Wright, Electoral Lies and the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L. REV. 759 
(2012). 
 34 Although it is possible that some non-neutral effects could be mitigated, as I argue in 
Flanders, supra note 30.   
 35. I address the deep and difficult question of neutrality between the two major parties and 
third parties at note 65 in Part II. However, I think there is a tight and highly useful correspondence 
to be drawn between neutrality and nonpartisanship, so that neutrality means roughly ―neutrality 
between the two major parties.‖ 
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might think that the court has an especially important role to play: strike 
down those laws that are made with deliberate partisan intent, that serve to 
rig the game in favor of one party, not just as a matter of accidental effect, 
but as a matter of deliberate partisan policy.  
This is true, but all the same, we should not ignore the possibility that 
in some cases, there will be election rules that are truly neutral in aim. If 
these exist, then we might think that the court‘s role should be to preserve 
these agreements, and to not upset them. But do any such rules exist? 
II.  VEIL OF IGNORANCE RULES IN ELECTION LAW 
The previous Part began with the conventional understanding of 
neutrality, one we find both in Wechsler and in Rawls: neutrality is 
neutrality of aim, and not neutrality of result. The point of neutrality, in 
other words, is not that all policies or judicial decisions have neutral 
effects—this would be impossible—but that they have a neutral purpose, or 
at least a neutral enough purpose. Such neutrality is what we should expect 
of our legislatures and our judges. 
 A.  Behind a Veil of Ignorance 
This Part will demonstrate how certain election rules can be neutral in 
aim. I will call these ―veil of ignorance rules‖ for reasons that will shortly 
become clear. With respect to these rules, there is (or should be) little 
question whether they are neutral in aim, because the parties crafting the 
rules could not know whether they would ultimately help them further their 
own interests. And although this leaves open the possibility that the rules 
may nonetheless have non-neutral effects, these effects may, in the end, be 
less harmful than if the rules had been chosen with deliberately partisan 
aims in mind. So, veil of ignorance rules will both achieve neutrality of 
aim and, possibly, avoid the dangers of non-neutral effects. 
What then characterizes these rules? The device of the ―veil of 
ignorance‖ was presented in Rawls‘s A Theory of Justice as a way of 
thinking about how to come up with the correct principles of justice.
36
 
Suppose, Rawls had us imagine, that we knew nothing of our personal 
attributes—we knew nothing about who we actually were, not our race, not 
our sex, not our wealth, nor even our beliefs about what things were worth 
having in life. Without any of that knowledge, what principles could we all 
agree upon to govern our lives together?
37
 
Why is such a device necessary? Rawls worried that if we did know 
what our places in society were, we would be tempted to choose principles 
that would benefit us, in our concrete circumstances.
38
 If we knew that we 
                                                                                                                     
 36. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 136–42. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 136. 
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were a certain race, or a certain gender, we might naturally choose 
principles that would give us an edge. Or suppose we knew what religion 
we were; in that case, we might imagine a society governed only by 
members of that religion, or perhaps one that gave special privileges to 
members of that religion. We might be especially tempted to do this if we 
thought that our religion was the true religion—we might think it obvious 
that those adherents of the true religion should be given special treatment 
in society.
39
 Placing the veil of ignorance over us forces us to choose 
principles without the temptation of favoring ourselves, as we actually 
are.
40
 We cannot special plead.   
According to Rawls, the veil is a ―device of representation.‖41 It is not 
without its normative presuppositions,
42
 and as a result, the fact that 
principles are chosen from behind the veil does not suffice, by itself, to 
justify those principles. But what Rawls wants to model is a certain 
conception of neutrality in choosing the principles of justice, and in this 
capacity the metaphor of the veil works wonderfully. We do not have to 
imagine abstractly what neutral principles would look like—we simply 
have to imagine what we would choose if we had to choose without 
knowing whether we would benefit from the principles we chose.
43
 Such 
principles would be neutral because they were chosen by (featureless) 
people who could not—because of the constraints of the veil—be non-
neutral. These people do not know whether they will be poor or rich, 
members of the majority or minority religion, Republicans or Democrats, 
when they remove the veil. Thus, they will choose principles in this 
vacuum, with the idea that they do not want to live under principles that 
will harm their interests, no matter where they end up in society.
44
 This, 
Rawls suggests, forces them to be neutral—to seek out principles that will 
be fair to everybody. They will try to be fair to everybody, because if they 
are not, they may end up being the ―somebody‖ who is specially 
disadvantaged by the rules.
45
 
But the fact remains that the veil is simply a device of representation—
in other words, a thought experiment. How realistic is it that when we 
choose actual laws, we will be choosing behind a veil of ignorance? The 
question seems especially pressing when we turn to election law, where 
partisanship is not only ubiquitous, but essentially ineliminable. We need 
only turn to the issue of partisan gerrymandering to see how this is true; not 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Id. at 139–40. 
 40. Id. 
 41. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 83 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).  
 42 A move for which Rawls has been criticized. See, e.g., ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND 
MORALITY 19–20 (1978). 
 43. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 136–42. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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only do the parties know who they are, they deliberately, and with 
increasing efficiency, craft the rules to benefit their own party and to harm 
the other party. Or consider a more controversial example: photo 
identification laws.
46
 For the most part, requiring photo identification to 
vote tends to hurt Democratic voters more; it is harder for the poor, and the 
elderly, to obtain that identification, and they tend to vote Democratic.
47
 It 
is not hard to imagine (indeed, it is hard not to imagine) that the legislators 
advocating such measures are interested in more than abstractly preventing 
fraud. Rather, they know—because they know who they are, and what rules 
will benefit their party—that photo identification requirements will 
ultimately have non-neutral effects.
48
 
 So it might seem that the veil of ignorance, while useful in theory, 
remains less so in practice. Very rarely do we have situations where 
legislators do not know who they are and what rules will benefit them and 
their party. Of course, we could ask them to legislate as if behind a veil of 
ignorance—and indeed, this is the point of the thought experiment in 
Rawls‘s original incarnation. We know where we are, now, but we are to 
imagine that we do not know our position in society, the better to make 
sure the principles we do choose are suitably neutral. 
 But what if we could identify instances where there were de facto veil 
of ignorance rules? That is, what if we could identify some instances where 
legislators were actually working in circumstances where they could not 
say whether the rules they chose would in fact benefit their party or their 
candidacy? Such rules would fit the categorization of veil of ignorance 
rules, and they would require no effort of the imagination. The people 
would be acting behind a veil in the sense that they would not know 
whether the laws they selected would end up benefiting them. The result is 
that—even though they knew who they were when picking the rules—the 
rules they chose would be neutral, or at least neutral in aim. Such situations 
would effectively simulate what Rawls was after in designing the veil of 
ignorance thought experiment.  
 But are there such situations in election law? At first blush, it would 
seem not, because most of the time legislators will be aware of the effect of 
the rules they choose, and will choose accordingly. But this impression 
turns out to be incorrect. In fact, there are possibly many situations where 
                                                                                                                     
 46. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upholding a 
photo identification law in Indiana against constitutional attack); Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 
201 (Mo. 2006) (striking down a photo identification law in Missouri as unconstitutional).  
 47.  See generally Chad Flanders, How (and Why) to Think About Voter Fraud, 41 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 93 (2007). 
 48 Again, the claim here is not that voter fraud measures are only motivated by partisan 
concerns; rather, it is that those partisan concerns are not unwelcome and at a certain level are 
desired.  For a fuller discussion of the voter fraud debate see Flanders, supra note 47; see also Dan 
Kahan, “Ideology In” or “Cultural Cognition Of” Judging: What Difference Does It Make?, 92 
MARQUETTE L. REV. 413, 414–17 (2009). 
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we can identify de facto veil of ignorance rules. 
B.  De Facto Veil of Ignorance Rules 
Again, what we are interested in is the following: according to Rawls, 
one way of modeling neutrality of aim is to imagine the parties (here we 
are not talking about political parties, but just about persons) choosing 
principles as if they were behind a veil of ignorance, where they are 
deprived of information that would tempt them to make biased choices, 
choices that would benefit them to the exclusion of others.
49
 But the 
question remains whether such situations are ever actually present in the 
context of election law. Obviously, legislators know to which political 
party they belong, and which rules will benefit them. We might, however, 
approximate a veil of ignorance if there were situations where legislators 
could not know the effects of the rules they were drafting. So this is our 
question: Are there situations where legislators drafting rules for elections 
are in fact unaware of whether the rules they select will benefit them? 
This Article argues that there are such situations, and it will examine 
two recent examples of them in depth. But first, I want to illustrate more 
what I mean by a de facto veil of ignorance rule through a somewhat less 
perfect example. It will help us get a firm grasp on the necessary conditions 
that must be in place for there to be veil rules. 
Consider, then, a legislature tasked with creating the rules for deciding 
when polls should close on election day.
50
 First of all, there has to be some 
rule for when polls close. They cannot be open all year long, running 24 
hours, 7 days a week. There has to be a time when they open, and a time 
when they close (although the existence of mail-in ballots presents an 
obvious complication, to which this Article will turn shortly). So, 
rulemaking in this situation is unavoidable; neutrality cannot mean simply 
not setting a closing time at all. Second, it is not obvious which way a later 
or earlier closing time will cut in the election. That is, it is hard to know 
whether closing the polls at 6:00 p.m. rather than 8:00 p.m. will benefit one 
party or another.
51
 So the legislators drafting the rule are more or less in a 
state of ignorance as to which way they should frame the rule in order to 
benefit themselves. This mirrors the situation in which those behind 
Rawls‘s veil of ignorance find themselves. They, too, do not know which 
rule will benefit them. However, in the case of choosing poll closing times, 
this is not because we ask legislators to imagine that they are not a member 
of any party; it is simply because, even though they know they are 
Republicans or Democrats, they do not know, in advance, how to make a 
                                                                                                                     
 49. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 136–42. 
 50. Thanks to Kirsten Nussbaumer for suggesting this example. For an actual case closely 
resembling these facts, see Missouri ex rel. Bush-Cheney 2000, Inc. v. Baker, 34 S.W.3d 410, 411–
12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).  
 51. See, e.g., Cleland v. Porter, 74 Ill. 76, 79 (1874). 
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rule that will benefit them. 
 But some might think that this is an imperfect example, and I would 
agree. For one, it might seem that the legislators will know what rule will 
benefit what party. Again, for reasons much like the photo identification 
case discussed above, we might think that later poll hours would benefit 
Democratic voters, who may not be able to take time off of work, or who 
might have to take extraordinary measures to get to the polling place. It 
might be no coincidence that when, in St. Louis, a judge allowed a polling 
place to close later, it was the Republicans who challenged the change, and 
the Democrats who supported it.
52
 So here we have an example of an 
imperfect, or only partial, veil.
53
 
Indeed, the more we expand the possibilities for polling place openings 
and closings, the less it may seem that we can get a neutral rule at all. What 
about mailing in ballots up to two weeks before the election? Or early 
voting? These measures might seem to favor Democrats, for reasons 
similar to the ones discussed above concerning registration requirements: 
those who do not have the ability to take time off, or who have to arrange 
for transportation, will have a harder time voting the more restrictive the 
times and opportunities for voting become. Again, then, it seems hard to 
find a case where the situation will truly simulate a veil of ignorance. 
Worse, it seems that the more election cycles there are, the more 
information legislators will get about the effects of rules; they will know 
next time, if they did not know this time, what types of rules will most 
favor their side. 
But if the class of veil of ignorance situations is small, it is not 
nonexistent, and indeed, two high-profile election law disputes provide 
nearly perfect examples.
54
 
1.  Correct Spelling on Write-In Ballots 
 Consider first the situation of Lisa Murkowski, who was recently 
reelected as Senator from Alaska, and the election rules she faced.
55
 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See Baker, 34 S.W.3d at 411.  
 53. See also Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2004) (challenge by working mothers 
to closing times of polling places in Illinois).  
 54. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1066 (Ill. 2011); Miller v. 
Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 869 (Alaska 2010). These examples are ideal because they show how 
veils might be naturally occurring. It is a separate question whether we ought to deliberately 
structure institutions to more closely resemble the choice situation Rawls describes. I am grateful to 
Professor Adam Cox for pointing this out to me. See his important article, Designing Redistricting 
Institutions, 5 ELECTION L.J. 412 (2006) (arguing that discussion about redistricting reform has been 
too narrowly focused and suggesting additional mechanisms that could achieve such reform). The 
trouble, as always, is how to get veil of ignorance rules that are not de facto enacted into law, given 
the powerful motivations legislators have to make rules that favor their own party. This, again, 
shows the importance of veil rules that just happen, rather than rules that have to be created.  
 55. See Chad W. Flanders, How Do You Spell M-U-R-K-O-W-S-K-I? Part I: The Question of 
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Murkowski was initially considered a shoo-in to be the Republican 
candidate for the Senate seat she already held. But this was before anti-
incumbent sentiment swelled, and Alaska Republicans—fueled by money 
and energy from the Tea Party movement—backed outsider candidate Joe 
Miller. Miller won the primary, and Murkowski decided to run as a write-
in candidate. Suddenly, Alaska‘s Division of Elections was called upon to 
regulate a relatively rare event—and to apply rules that were made many 
years before, and probably without much deep thought: the rules governing 
write-in candidates, both before and after the ballots were cast.  
The first question the Division faced was to what extent election 
officials could aid voters who might have trouble spelling a candidate‘s 
name correctly on the ballot.
56
 Could the Division of Elections post a list of 
write-in candidates at the polling places in order to assist voters? Could 
poll workers supply a list of eligible write-in candidates to those who 
asked? Or, to take the most salient case, could they simply tell a voter how 
to spell ―Murkowski‖? The regulations on the books seemed to suggest 
that there was very little room for poll workers to help voters spell a 
candidate‘s name correctly. The governing regulation simply and flatly 
prohibited poll workers from giving any ―information‖ about write-in 
candidates, other than mechanical information about how to actually cast a 
write-in vote.
57
 
We might pause here to note that these questions had to be answered in 
the middle of a campaign. The director of the Division of the Elections 
could not sit on the sidelines, and any decision she made would have 
obvious partisan effects. If she decided to stick with the default rule, which 
would limit any assistance to voters seeking to write in the name of a 
candidate, it would obviously benefit Miller—his name was on the ballot, 
because he won the primary. But if the director decided instead to allow 
more assistance to write-in voters (which is what she ultimately did), it 
would benefit Murkowski. Most write-in voters would be seeking help to 
spell her name; although the field did become crowded, very few, if any, of 
the candidates were serious competitors, especially compared to Murkowski. In 
essence, there was no decision that would not have had non-neutral effects. 
No matter the interpretation, one side would benefit, and the other would 
suffer. 
The correct resolution of this part of the Murkowski litigation was 
difficult, and has been written on elsewhere.
58
 In fact, there were conflicting 
rules at play. The regulation by the Division of Elections seemed to suggest 
a hard line on assisting voters, but a broader statute governing elections 
                                                                                                                     
Voter Assistance, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 4–9 (2011). 
 56. Id. at 6–8. 
 57. Id. at 7. 
 58. See generally id.; see also Chad Flanders, Spelling Murkowski: The Next Act, Reply to 
Fishkin and Levitt, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 49 (2011). 
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seemed to compel a more generous role for poll workers.
59
 In this case, the 
existing rules did not point to one clear outcome, despite the fact that, in 
the end, the Alaska Supreme Court decided that the statute should 
govern.
60
  
What this Article will now address is the litigation that occurred after 
the election was over, about how and whether to count ballots that had not 
correctly spelled ―Murkowski.‖ The question became whether those ballots 
should be counted. Unlike the preelection litigation, the standard here 
seemed rather clear. Only the correctly spelled ballots could be counted.
61
 
There seemed to be little wiggle room to allow for an intent of the voter 
standard, under which, for instance, a vote for ―Lisa Mulkowski‖ would be 
counted, because the voter most likely intended to vote for Murkowski. 
The statute read, simply, that the name of the candidate had to be spelled in 
the same way as it was on his or her official declaration of candidacy.
62
 No 
exceptions. 
This Article will later address how this statute should be best 
interpreted.
63
 The concern here is about the character of the rule. We 
should note two things. First of all, regarding the question of how to count 
write-in ballots, we have a situation where there clearly has to be some 
rule. Will this ballot count, or will it not count? There is no room to stand 
back and not decide. And of course, given the context, one decision will 
favor one party, while a different decision will favor the other party. There 
is no possible rule that will be neutral in its effects. If we choose a lax rule 
for reading ballots, this helps Murkowski. If we read the statute strictly, 
this benefits the Miller campaign. A rule has to be set, and whatever rule is 
set will have effects that cannot be neutral.  
But this leads to the second important point about the rule Alaska had 
for counting write-in ballots. It does seem that the rule was truly made 
under conditions of ignorance about which party would benefit.
 
That is to 
say, the regulation about counting write-in ballots seems to have been 
produced behind a de facto veil of ignorance. By this, the Article means 
several things. The legislators who made the rule, to the extent that they 
were thinking about a close race with a write-in candidate involved at all, 
would not know which way a strict or lax rule would cut.
 
Imagine what 
would have to be the case for them to have some knowledge that would 
sway them either way. Is there any reason to think, ex ante, that members 
of a certain party will be more likely to have a difficult name to spell than 
any other party? So, due to indifference or because the relevant knowledge 
was unavailable, the rule that was fashioned was done so in a way that 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 7–8. 
 60. Id. at 8.  
 61. Id. at 25–26. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See infra Subsection III.B.1. 
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truly was neutral in aim.
64
 The rule, that is, was made without regard to 
which party might benefit from the rule being this way or that way.
65
 
 2.  Residency Requirements 
Now we will consider a second example of a rule that was most likely 
designed under conditions that resembled a de facto veil of ignorance. In 
the recent mayoral election in Chicago, it became a point of controversy 
whether Rahm Emanuel was indeed a resident of Chicago.
66
 The 
controversy initially seemed bizarre. Emanuel had lived in Chicago for 
many years, and had even represented a suburb of Chicago in the United 
                                                                                                                     
 64. In the Murkowski case, this needs to be refined even further, because in part the 
Murkowski litigation was based on an intra-party dispute: the Tea Party Republican candidate 
(Miller) and the candidate of the Republican establishment (Murkowski).  In a way, however, this 
helps my point. Because we do not know the effects of the rules when we make them, we do not 
know which party they will help, and even which faction within a party they will help, either. So 
these rules are not only not partisan, they are even neutral with regard to various ideologies within a 
party. I am grateful to James Lindgren for pressing me on this point. 
 65. But might the rules regarding write-in ballots be biased against third parties (or 
candidates not on the ballot) in general? I am not so sure, or at least this is not the level at which I 
want to analyze the question of neutrality. It may be the case that third parties have a harder time 
winning elections, and this may be because of some structural features about their being able to run 
for office in the first place. The rules that govern this aspect of the political process may not, in fact, 
be neutral. They may make it more difficult for parties outside of the major two parties to get on the 
ballot, and avoid having to run write-in candidacies. However, if we focus just on the question of 
correct spelling versus intent of the voter, I am not sure that the rule here ex ante favors any 
particular type of candidate, whether Republican, Democratic, Libertarian, Green, or what have you. 
There is no reason to believe there is any correlation between a hard-to-spell name and ideological 
affiliation. So the rule regarding the spelling on write-in ballots is still, I conclude, neutral. This 
does not mean that there may not be a larger, structural unfairness to the fact that third-party 
candidates might be limited to write-in candidacies. On this larger unfairness, see my Deliberative 
Dilemmas: A Critique of Deliberation Day from the Perspective of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 
147, 153–55 (2007). But the point is, within the context of the choice between correct spelling and 
intent of the voter, there is no obvious way in which either rule stacks the deck in favor of a 
particular party or cause or ideology. 
This leads me to a final, theoretical point. There are levels of neutrality in election law. The 
level I am most interested in is rules that are neutral as between the two major parties, or in a word, 
nonpartisan rules. There is a higher level of neutrality, which is neutrality as between all parties 
(Green, Libertarian, etc.). (There might be a still higher level, for example, neutrality between all 
candidates.) A rule that is neutral at one level might not be neutral at another. Indeed, this seems to 
be the case with the rule about write-in ballots. Parties that do not make the ballot are clearly 
disadvantaged. But it is not obvious that the fact of write-in ballots would tend to disadvantage one 
of the two major parties more than another. For more on levels of neutrality, see generally 
Koppelman, supra note 17. If one thinks, as I do, that rules that entrench the major parties are in 
some respects inevitable, and not necessarily bad, the observations of Justice Stephen Breyer in his 
Vieth dissent are instructive. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 357 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (stating that American districting favors a two-party system and that two-party system 
enables electoral accountability).  
 66. See Chad W. Flanders, When Is a Home Not a Home?, MO. L. WKLY. 21 (Feb. 14, 2011). 
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States House of Representatives.
67
 More generally, Emanuel had long been 
a player in Chicago politics. It was hard to imagine Emanuel somehow not 
being a resident of Chicago. And the reason for Emanuel‘s absence from 
Chicago for some time prior to the mayoral race was among the most 
innocuous imaginable: he was in Washington, D.C., working in the Obama 
administration as the chief of staff. Emanuel was not off trying to win 
elections in some other place, or working at a high-paying job in another 
state or another city. Rather, he was serving his country. 
 Yet Emanuel‘s absence made the residency requirement an issue. He 
had not been living in Chicago for a year prior to the election, and this 
seemed to trigger a bar against his running for mayor. His case wound its 
way through various administrative agencies, then to Illinois district court, 
and eventually to the Illinois Supreme Court, which ruled—albeit on rather 
narrow grounds—that Emanuel could run as a mayoral candidate.68 The 
debate surrounding the case was predictably raucous. It was the first 
election in which Mayor Richard M. Daley was no longer a candidate, and 
Chicago politics not being bean-bag, everyone was keenly aware that the 
decision would crucially affect the race. If Emanuel could run as a 
candidate, he would almost surely win. Again, as in many election law 
cases, the decision of the court would be strongly outcome-determinative. 
If it ruled one way, Emanuel would be the winner. If it ruled the other way, 
the race would, all of a sudden, be wide open, and the identity of the new 
front-runner would be anyone‘s guess. 
 The merits of the decision are not the main concern in this Subsection, 
although this Article will revisit them later, as they become relevant in 
trying to determine the role of courts in election law cases.
69
 Rather, the 
focus here is on the character of the rule at issue in the Emanuel case. The 
rule was about requirements for residency. How long does someone 
actually have to reside in a particular area in order to run as a candidate for 
an office there? The reasons for longer or shorter residency requirements 
are familiar, as are those for having residency requirements in the first 
place. We want a candidate who is seeking to represent a particular area 
and to govern in that area‘s interests, someone who has a feel for that area, 
knows the people, and to an extent embodies its character. We do not 
think—not yet, anyway—that representation and governing are simply a 
matter of disinterested expertise. We want someone who thinks like us, and 
can act on our behalf in a familiar way. Quite frankly, if our mayor is going 
to be a scoundrel, we want him to be our scoundrel. Of course, this is not 
to say that residency requirements should be absurdly demanding. We do 
not want to limit running for office in a particular area only to those, say, 
who were born there or who have lived there for twenty years. We do not 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Id.  
 68. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1066 (Ill. 2011). 
 69. See infra Section III.B. 
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want to restrict the pool of candidates too narrowly, and miss qualified 
candidates who have some connection to the area, but not necessarily a 
long-standing one.  
 Moreover, none of these reasons for, or against, residency requirements 
really tip in the direction of any party or even one type of candidate. It 
would be hard to say in any election that the person who has lived longest 
in the district is more likely a Republican or a Democratic candidate, and 
that steep residency requirements would tilt one partisan way or another. If 
they did, the effect would probably be slight, and rather unpredictable. To 
put it another way, it is hard to imagine a coalition from one party that 
could mobilize in favor of stronger or weaker residency requirements in 
general, absent knowing that one candidate would benefit from those 
requirements. The reasons that could be marshaled on either side are such 
that they do not obviously advertise their partisan leanings. They seem to 
be neutral reasons. 
 All of this is essentially the long way around to reach a simple 
conclusion. It seems that residency requirement rules are made under a de 
facto veil of ignorance. The major parties cannot know ahead of time 
whether the rule that they choose will benefit the candidate of their party or 
another. There is no reason to believe that the rules governing the mayoral 
race of 2011 were drafted in order to disadvantage the likely Democratic 
front-runner, thereby making victory possible for another Democratic 
candidate, or even a Republican.
70
 Rather, they were made with a concern 
for the neutral reasons proffered on either side. We may disagree with the 
line drawn by the legislature in this instance, but that disagreement will rest 
on reasons of substance. It is only when we lift the veil that our 
disagreements take on more than a substantive cast.  
 Remember that this discussion is not about the merits of the Emanuel 
litigation—at least, not yet. The case was extremely complicated and tough 
to decide. It involved issues not merely of legislative intent, but also of 
deference to the ruling of the Board of Elections.
71
 But it should be 
emphasized, at least initially, that this is an example of rules drafted with 
true neutrality of aim.  
This still leaves the question of why neutrality of aim in this context 
should matter, and if so, how. Does neutrality of aim mean that the laws 
should get a free pass from courts? Perhaps not entirely, but it does entitle 
them to greater deference. The argument for that conclusion will be made 
in the next Part. 
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 71. See id. at 1064. 
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III.  LIMITING THE REACH OF THE DEMOCRACY CANON 
In an important and ground-breaking article, Professor Hasen 
developed both an analysis and an argument for the use of what he calls the 
―Democracy Canon‖ of statutory interpretation.72 In several shorter pieces, 
as well as numerous blog postings, Hasen has applied the Democracy 
Canon to several recent election law cases—including the Murkowski and 
Emanuel litigations.
73
 The Democracy Canon, Hasen alleges with some 
force, has been neglected in discussions of statutory interpretation. But at 
the same time, Hasen shows that the Democracy Canon has repeatedly 
been used in election law cases, especially state law cases.
74
 It has been 
used to decide cases in a way that is hoped to be roughly nonpartisan, and 
fair. 
A.  The Democracy Canon: A Very Brief Introduction 
What then is the Democracy Canon? Briefly, it is a rule of statutory 
interpretation suggesting that, when presented with an ambiguous statute, 
courts should interpret it to allow the greatest ability for voters to vote and 
candidates to run.
75
 Take for an example the first round of the Murkowski 
litigation, where the question was to what extent poll workers could aid 
voters in spelling Murkowski‘s name.76 While it seemed that this case was 
decided on relatively straightforward statutory grounds, it could also have 
been decided using the Democracy Canon. It was arguably ambiguous 
what ―assisting‖ voters meant, but it seemed clear that the way to allow for 
the greatest effectuation of voter intent was to permit poll workers to help 
voters spell the name ―Murkowski.‖ The Democracy Canon thus would 
require a broad reading of the word ―assist.‖  
 The canon is also useful in cases involving candidate eligibility to run 
for office. Consider a simple, recent example: a candidate who had served 
part of a term, followed by two full terms, who wanted to run for a third 
full term in the upcoming election.
77
 The question raised was whether, in 
understanding the term limits statute, which limited officeholders to three 
consecutive terms, part of a ―term‖ counted as having served a previous 
―term.‖78 If it did, then the candidate could not run, because he would have 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Hasen, supra note 6, at 71 . The Democracy Canon is not listed in William Eskridge‘s list 
of canons of statutory construction in WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 
app‘x. 3 (1994) (―The Rehnquist Court‘s Canons of Statutory Construction‖).   
 73. See Hasen, Rahm, supra note 10; Hasen, Alaska, supra note 10. 
 74. See Hasen, supra note 6, at 75–83. 
 75. See id. (describing the history of the Democracy Canon and its role in both state and 
federal courts).  
 76. Order at 2, Alaska, Div. of Elections v. Alaska Democratic Party, No. S-14054 (Alaska 
Oct. 29, 2010). 
 77. Municipality of Anchorage v. Mjos, 179 P.3d 941, 942–43 (Alaska 2008).  
 78.  Id. at 943. 
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served three terms.
79
 The statute in that case was ambiguous, but the court, 
relying explicitly on the Democracy Canon, said that the candidate should 
be able to run, in order to give voters the ultimate say on whether the 
candidate should be able to represent them.
80
 
 Here we get to the underlying justification for the Democracy Canon. 
The best solution for close cases in election law is to leave it to the will of 
the voters. This may mean either positively aiding them (as in the early 
Murkowski litigation)
81
 or simply removing barriers to candidate entry. 
Democracy means that the people rule, and if statutes can be read in a way 
that lets the people make the choices—by having their votes counted, and 
by letting them choose the candidates—then this is the reading we should 
prefer. This way, the people—not the courts, and not the legislature—are 
given the final say in an election.  
Moreover—and this is an advantage Hasen touts—the Democracy 
Canon also has a plausible claim to neutrality in deciding cases.
82
 As this 
Article emphasizes, a key problem with judicial intervention in election 
law cases is that the deciding court usually favors one particular party over 
the other. This creates the risk that the court will be perceived as deciding 
in a partisan way—as in Bush v. Gore,83 which still lingers over the 
Supreme Court, and exists as a challenge to its legitimacy.
84
 But the 
Democracy Canon offers a way out of this bind. It gives the court grounds 
for its decision that clearly rest not on favoritism to one party or the other, 
but on a preference for democracy, or having the voters decide.
85
 The court 
is able to present itself as a defender of the people‘s right to vote and to 
select candidates, not a defender of one party‘s rights over the other. The 
winner in the early Murkowski case was the voter;
86
 likewise in the term-
limits litigation described above. In those instances, the voters were given a 
choice whether to elect the candidate or not.
87
 That choice was not taken 
away from them by the court.   
B.  The Canon: Some Initial Skepticism about Applications 
Professor Christopher Elmendorf, in a wide-ranging and provocative 
article, has challenged Hasen‘s claim that the Democracy Canon is indeed 
nonpartisan and neutral.
88
 Elmendorf argues that the Democracy Canon 
                                                                                                                     
 79.  Id. at 942–43. 
 80.  Id. at 943 n.1. 
 81.  Hasen, Alaska, supra note 10. 
 82.  See Hasen, supra note 6, at 77. 
 83.  531 U.S. 98 (2000).   
 84. See McConnell, supra note 1, at 103–04; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 4.   
 85.  Mjos, 179 P.3d at 943 n.1. 
 86.  See Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 869 (Alaska 2010). 
 87.  See id. 
 88. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1051 
(2010) (discussing the problems with the Democracy Canon). 
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takes sides on disputed issues of voter and candidate responsibility—and 
that the sides it takes are of a recognizably partisan cast.
89
 Allowing voters 
to vote when they have not accurately followed registration guidelines—or 
forgiving voter ignorance or candidate unpreparedness—tend to be liberal 
positions, and tend to favor Democratic candidates.  
I am not unsympathetic to Elmendorf‘s concern. It will be addressed 
briefly later in this Section, and more thoroughly in the next.
90
 But this will 
not be the main concern in what immediately follows. Rather, this Section 
will look closely at Hasen‘s popular writings that invoke the Democracy 
Canon in particular election contests and to test whether these are cases 
where the Canon should be used—that is, cases where the statute is 
genuinely ambiguous, and courts are in need of an interpretive crutch. It 
will also argue that in some cases—including the Murkowski and the 
Emanuel litigations—the Democracy Canon might be antidemocratic. But 
first, let us review the cases.  
1.  Murkowski 
 Let‘s begin with the controversy between Senator Lisa Murkowski and 
Joe Miller. Aside from the extent to which voters could be assisted in 
spelling the name of a write-in candidate,
91
 a major component of that 
controversy was whether voters who did not spell Lisa Murkowski‘s name 
exactly would have their votes counted.
92
 The Alaska Supreme Court, after 
litigation by Miller‘s campaign, ruled that the standard should be the intent 
of the voter, rather than the (stricter) standard—possibly implied by the 
relevant statute—that only the correctly spelled write-in ballot should 
count.
93
 This is a controversial result; although I have previously argued 
that the court‘s decision to allow assistance with spelling was correct, I am 
less sure about its decision to count incorrectly spelled ballots.
94
 Indeed, 
the considerations brought to bear about the law at issue having been made 
behind a veil of ignorance give us a strong (but perhaps not conclusive) 
reason to reject the court‘s conclusion.  
 But before turning to the substance of that debate, it is perhaps worth 
pausing to consider the possibility that the court need not have decided the 
correct reading of the statute liberal or conservative at all. By the time 
Miller‘s case had made it to the Alaska Supreme Court, it was clear that 
even if he won every ballot challenge, he would still not have enough votes 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Id. at 1053–54. 
 90.  See infra Part III. 
 91.  Miller, 245 P.3d at 876. 
 92.  Id. at 869. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Flanders, supra note 55, at 28 (concluding that ―the Alaska Supreme Court probably 
reached the correct result in State, Division of Elections v. Alaska Democratic Party‖); cf. Flanders, 
Next Act, supra note 58. 
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to beat Murkowski.
95
 Miller‘s attempt to convince the court and the 
Division of Elections to accept his standard for reading the ballots was 
bootless. There was no way that the outcome of the litigation could change 
anything. The court was certainly within its rights to simply call the matter 
moot and move past it. 
Alaska‘s supreme court did not take up the mootness issue, but the 
superior court did, finding that although Miller‘s lawsuit was technically 
moot, the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied.
96
 The 
issue, the court reasoned, was capable of review, and the continued 
application of the mootness doctrine might cause the issue to repeatedly 
circumvent review.
97
 Finally, the issue was of great public importance,
98
 
although, of course, in the end a determination of mootness is as much a 
policy decision as it is a pure question of law. All of the factors listed by 
the supreme court are judgment calls, and matters of degree, not simple 
black and white formulas.
99
 And there certainly was a case for not calling 
Miller‘s lawsuit moot, having to do with reasons with which this Article 
began. In many election law contests that are brought before the courts, it 
is very hard for the courts to remain above the fray. Any decision they 
make could potentially have effects on the outcome of an election. 
But with an election case that is actually moot—that is, where the 
decision by the court will not determine the winner or loser of an 
election—there may be a stronger case for the court to go ahead and decide 
the issue. In the Miller–Murkowski situation, nothing really hung on the 
court‘s decision, except for the correct legal determination. The court, 
given the facts as they had unfolded previously, was free to rule without 
the pressure that their decision would decide who won or who lost. 
Mootness, in that situation, is actually a blessing, and an invitation to rule, 
not a disincentive to do so. Mootness means that the case can be decided in 
a largely apolitical vacuum, to the extent such a thing is ever possible in 
law, let alone election law. And of course the superior court was right that 
an important legal question was at play (whether it is an issue that would 
repeatedly come up is another, and more dubious, claim). But there is a 
further reason in the election law context to rule on an issue when it is 
moot, in addition to its being an important legal issue: because nothing 
rides on the outcome, the court is freed (at least somewhat) from the risk of 
appearing to be a political court. 
This does not mean, however, that the court should be free to make the 
wrong decision. A decision to rule on a case that could be moot shifts the 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Miller v. Campbell, No. 1JU-10-1007-CI, 2010 WL 5072024, at *13 (Alaska Super. Ct. 
Dec. 10, 2010).  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at *13–14. 
 99. See Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 869–70 (Alaska 2010). 
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pressure from leaving an issue undecided—and so capable of being 
revisited or changed by other actors, such as the legislature—to reaching 
the correct result in the case. There are risks to action, just as there are risks 
to inaction, as illustrated by the public interest exception. And so to see if 
the court ruled correctly, we need to look at its decision closely. 
The issue in the Murkowski case was the proper interpretation of the 
statute regulating write-in ballots.
100
 The language at issue was a little 
confusing, although ultimately rather straightforward:  
A vote for a write-in candidate . . . shall be counted if the oval 
is filled in for that candidate and if the name, as it appears on 
the write-in declaration of candidacy, of the candidate or the 
last name of the candidate is written in the space provided.
101
  
Miller favored a reading of the statute that required that the name on 
the ballot be spelled exactly as it had appeared on the write-in declaration 
of candidacy.
102
 At the very least, Miller argued, the last name had to be 
spelled correctly.
103
 Of course, Lisa Murkowski‘s name is not the easiest to 
spell, so there were ballots that spelled it wrong.
104
 There were also ballots 
that had information in addition to Lisa Murkowski (such as ―Lisa 
Murkowski, Republican‖), which Miller also sought to challenge.105 
This is at least a plausible reading of the statute. It is also plausible—
likely, even—that the statue, like many statutes, is simply a poorly drafted 
one.  But we note that the result of Miller‘s plausible reading is that some 
voters would be disenfranchised, namely, those whose intent was clearly to 
vote for Murkowski but who nonetheless got her name wrong on the write-
in ballot. (Miller‘s argument that some voters may have deliberately 
misspelled Murkowski as a way of protesting seems specious.)
106
 
Nor is the result in this case entirely absurd, even though it might have 
disagreeable consequences. There is a need for precision and finality in 
elections, and that is secured by having a hard and fast rule about which 
votes to count. We can say, ex ante, that those ballots that are not clearly 
marked, or those names that are not correctly spelled, will not count. We 
                                                                                                                     
 100.  Id. at 874–77. 
 101. ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.360(a)(11) (2010). 
 102. Miller, 245 P.3d at 869–70. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 872. 
 105. Id.; see also Sean Cockerham, 98% of Write-In Votes Go to Murkowski, ALASKA DAILY 
NEWS (Nov. 10, 2010), available at http://www.adn.com/2010/11/10/1548282/senator-leading-as-
write-ins-counted.html (listing Miller‘s challenges to write-in ballots). 
 106. Id. at 869; see also Miller: We Can Assume All Poor Spellers Support Me, TPM (Nov. 9, 
2010), available at http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/2010/11/miller_poor_spellers_all 
_support_me.php (―But Miller‘s lawyer has another argument. Namely, that ballots with 
mispellings [sic] of Murkowski‘s name should be interpreted not as votes for her but rather as 
protest votes against her.‖). 
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can then simply throw out the ballots that do not fit these criteria and tally 
the remaining ballots. Having a vague and uncertain standard leads 
inevitably—as we have seen time and time again—to protracted 
squabbling and litigation. No one has the right to cast a vote come what 
may, if he misses a deadline, or fails to follow the rules, etc. And many 
rules, even though they are not perfect or the ones for which we might 
ideally wish, have sufficient rationales. Such was the case with the statute 
at play in this part of the Murkowski litigation.
107
 
The Alaska Supreme Court did not, however, take this view.
108
 It began 
its analysis not with a discussion of principles of statutory interpretation, 
but rather with a several-page discussion of the principles underlying the 
Democracy Canon.
109
 Citing numerous cases, the court emphasized its 
traditional commitment to enfranchising voters and to giving effect, when 
possible, to voter intent.
110
 The right to vote is fundamental, the court said, 
and should not be taken away due to ―mere mistake.‖111 This starting point 
is significant. It shows that the court had, in a way, already decided to take 
the side of the voter in interpreting the statute.
112
 
 But there are at least two problems with the court‘s stance. The first is 
a simple point of statutory construction. The Democracy Canon, like all 
canons, is an aid to statutory construction, not a substitute for it. As such, 
an initial threshold showing that the statute is ambiguous must be made. A 
court cannot read a criminal statute according to the rule of lenity if the 
statute in question is clear, and clearly harsh. It cannot say, ―the statute is 
too harsh, so we must make it less so by applying the rule of lenity.‖ So 
too, a court cannot say that a statute that disenfranchises voters must be 
made more generous by use of the Democracy Canon. Again, the canon is 
a tool to help understand the statute, not rewrite it. The court‘s failure to 
take any steps to show that the statute was ambiguous is revealing. It 
seemed to leapfrog over the possibility that the statute was clear in its 
meaning. The court, instead, focused on the bad result of the statute.
113
 But 
some statues will simply have bad results, and it is not the case that the 
                                                                                                                     
 107.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.360(a)(11) (2010). See also Flanders, Next Act, supra note 58. 
 108. Miller, 245 P.3d at 869. 
 109. Id. at 868–69.  The court did not explicitly use the phrase ―the Democracy Canon.‖ 
 110. Id. at 869. 
 111. Id. 
 112 In correspondence, Rick Hasen has emphasized that the Alaska court had traditionally 
used the ―Democracy Canon‖ and for it to not use it in this case would be to depart from this 
precedent (precedent of which the legislature had notice). This is a fair point, but I am not sure I am 
convinced. First, this assumes that the legislature knew that the statute it was drafting might not be 
clear, and that if it was not clear, it could rely on the court to read it democratically rather than 
strictly. Second, although the Alaska Courts have decided cases using versions of the Democracy 
Canon in the past, it is not clear that it was obvious that the court would always use the canon, so 
much so that the legislature could reasonably rely on the court to use it in every instance.   
 113.  Id. 
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court can rewrite those statutes by using a larger principle of 
enfranchisement. 
 There is a second problem. In the cases quoted by the court, the claim 
that mere mistake should not lead to the disenfranchisement of the voter 
refers to a mistake on the part of the government, not a mistake on the part 
of the voter.
114
 In the case of misspelling someone‘s name on the ballot, 
that mistake lies with the voter, not with the government; it is not the case 
that the vote is not counted through no fault of the voter. Of course, we 
certainly can imagine a statute that forgives such mistakes.
115
 But such was 
not the case with the Alaska statute. Concededly, there is still an issue 
about what the best policy is with regard to voter mistake, and whether it is 
fair to have the consequence of disenfranchisement rest on such a small 
thing—a mistake in spelling—when the voter‘s intent is clear. It might 
seem harsh or wrong to say that the voter is to blame for this, and that he 
should suffer the loss of his franchise.
116
 But this is a policy issue, not one 
that can be corrected by judicial interpretation. So even if the statute was 
ambiguous, it is still an open question whether the Democracy Canon 
helps. The Democracy Canon says in this instance, ―don‘t disenfranchise 
because of a mistake by the government.‖ In the case of misspelled ballots, 
there was no mistake by the government. 
 I should not overstate my point here. The court may well have been 
right in its conclusion. When pressed, one could find ambiguity in the 
statute.
117
 And the Democracy Canon might be broader than simply dealing 
with cases of government mistakes in tabulating votes. Both of these things 
might be true. But the court‘s decision to count misspelled ballots seems 
eminently contestable, which is most worrisome. The court stepped into a 
controversy that was, technically, moot, and gave a very broad reading of 
the election statute, one that seems to conflict with a straightforward 
reading of the statute. My sense is that the court not only appeared to be, 
but was in fact, non-neutral. Its non-neutrality might be on the side of the 
voter, and not of any particular party; that certainly seems plausible. In 
some cases, such non-neutrality might be warranted, in order to correct a 
bias inherent in the legislation. But such non-neutrality is especially 
unwelcome here, where the rule is one that has been made behind a veil of 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Id. (citing Carr v. Thomas, 586 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1978); Edgmon v. State, Office of 
Lieutenant Governor, Div. of Elections, 152 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2007)); see also State of Alaska, 
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 115. See id. at 870–71 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff–2(c)(3) (2006)). 
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ignorance.
118
 
2.  Emanuel 
The Alaska Supreme Court seemed clear in its preference for the 
principle of voter enfranchisement over the wording of the statute.
119
 It did 
not pause to consider whether the statute might have a plain meaning, 
rather than an ambiguous one, and it did not consider whether the 
Democracy Canon should be read differently in cases where the fault lay 
with the voter, rather than with the state. The court‘s decision in the 
Emanuel litigation is harder, and closer, for a variety of reasons (not all of 
which are pertinent to the themes of this Article). The decision involved an 
initial question of deference to the Election Board‘s finding that Emanuel 
was indeed a resident of Chicago.
120
 There was also an extended debate in 
the two courts that heard the Emanuel matter over the correct reading (and 
continued relevance) of Illinois case law on the definition of 
―residency.‖121 This Subsection will largely abstract from these questions, 
so what it says about the Emanuel case will be a little more tentative. 
Nonetheless, it will conclude with a point similar to the one made about 
the Murkowski case. The statute in question may be susceptible to a plain-
meaning interpretation, even though that plain meaning might be one that 
we could reject on policy grounds. We should not be too quick to revise 
the statute in light of a substantive disagreement with the content of the 
statute. 
So let us start simply with the text of the statute at issue—a point that, 
revealingly, the Illinois Supreme Court does not get to until the ninth page 
of its opinion.
122
 The statute reads: ―A person is not eligible for an elective 
municipal office unless that person is a qualified elector of the 
municipality and has resided in the municipality at least one year next 
preceding the election or appointment . . . .‖123 
The issue—to revisit one of the factual scenarios with which we 
began—was whether Rahm Emanuel, who had left Chicago to live in 
Washington, D.C., to work as President Barack Obama‘s chief of staff, was 
still a ―resident‖ of Chicago.124 He had retained a house in Chicago, which 
he had rented out, and he said he intended to move back to Chicago after 
serving in D.C.; but could it be said that he had been residing in Chicago 
                                                                                                                     
 118  At the very least, we have competing presumptions: one that favors the voter, and another 
that favors laws that are passed behind a veil of ignorance.   
 119.  Id.  
 120. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Ill. 2011). 
 121. Id. at 1054–57. 
 122. Id. at 1059–60 (quoting 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3.1–10–5(a) (West 2008)). 
 123.  Id. 
 124. Id. at 1053–54. 
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for the time he was gone?
125
 The question, in short, was whether ―reside‖ 
meant physically to be present, or merely to have property and the intention 
to reside.
126
  
The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the statute to mean that physical 
presence of some time was required to establish residency, but it was not 
the case that after establishing residency, one had to be physically 
present.
127
 It was enough that one had no intention of abandoning one‘s 
residence in the city; that was all ―intent‖ to reside meant.128 The court 
further buttressed its analysis by questioning whether, if physical presence 
were the standard for residency, it would lead to all sorts of odd results.
129
 
Would a person who traveled regularly to Florida each winter for a month 
lose his status as ―resident‖?130 Where would we draw the line? 
 But it is unclear that such questions are easily avoided on the other side 
of the ledger. If someone can remain a resident so long as he ―intends‖ to 
return, what are the limits of such intending? Could a person be gone from 
the city for ten years, always meaning to return but never quite being able 
to do so, and still be a ―resident‖? Here the policy reasons for such a 
requirement come to the fore. Obviously, cities and states have an interest 
in candidates who actually are from the area, and have recently lived there. 
A person who can be a resident merely by owning property in the area and 
having a vague intention to return—at some point in the future—would not 
necessarily be a good candidate. It is not crazy to think that this is sound 
policy, or at least not laughable. And the idea that something like regular 
physical presence—which could include vacations—is an impossible 
standard to define seems far-fetched. Finally, a claim made by the Illinois 
Supreme Court—that interpreting residency to mean physical presence for 
candidates would create an asymmetry between voters and candidates
131—
is not dispositive, either. We can imagine reasons why we would want to 
have candidates who know something about the area and its people; we 
might have lower standards for voter familiarity. Voters are not going to 
govern, candidates are, and governance requires familiarity with people 
and places of a type that takes time to acquire.
 
Carpetbagging candidates 
might be worse than carpetbagging voters. Or at least a legislature could 
think so. 
But the policy reasons are secondary to the main point here, which is 
that the statute, as written, admits of a rather plain reading, and it is not 
that residency is established merely by a domicile and intent to return. The 
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plain reading is that the candidate must have a home in the city, and 
actually live in it. The plain reading is certainly not absurd, given the 
policy reasons outlined above. And the statute certainly supports it; a 
candidate is not eligible unless he ―has resided‖ in the municipality at least 
one year next preceding the election.
132
 Certainly the ordinary, rather than 
legal, meaning of the sentence suggests the requirement that the person 
actually live in the place where he seeks to hold elective office. Of course, 
ordinary and legal meanings are not the same, and this is why the Illinois 
Supreme Court spent most of its opinion talking about the established legal 
meaning of residency.
133
 But even here, as the special concurrence points 
out, the case law was not at all clear, and it was possible to find support for 
the meaning that the circuit court gave to ―residency,‖ that is, actual 
physical presence.
134
 There is at least a colorable argument that the 
definition of residency could have gone either way, and that the plainer 
reading of the statute would have been to interpret ―residency‖ to mean 
actual physical presence.
135
  
The Illinois Supreme Court, in overturning the circuit court‘s 
decision,
136
 did not rely on the Democracy Canon. But in an editorial 
published before the court‘s decision, Hasen wrote that the court clearly 
could have used the canon in reaching its conclusion.
137
 Hasen strongly 
disagreed with the circuit court, writing that if the decision were to stand, 
the biggest losers would be the voters of Chicago.
138
 In his op-ed, Hasen 
rehearsed the arguments that the Illinois Supreme Court would later adopt: 
that interpreting residency to mean physical presence is ―overly stingy,‖ 
that it would create an asymmetry between candidates and voters, and that 
the circuit court‘s reading of precedent was wrong.139 But even if these 
arguments are not decisive, Hasen seemed to suggest that a larger principle 
should govern: let the voters decide whether Emanuel does not have the 
experience or the familiarity, that he is a ―carpetbagger.‖140 Give them the 
choice of candidates; do not take this away from them. The question of 
residency is a technicality, Hasen concluded, and the voters should not be 
denied their choice of candidate based on a technicality.
141
  
This is the argument from the Democracy Canon, and even if it is not 
explicit in the court‘s opinion, something like it might nonetheless have 
been motivating the stance it took—at the very least, this is something we 
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can infer Hasen would endorse. We should not let something like a 
residency requirement, certainly not one of ambiguous meaning, stop a 
candidate from running. Politics certainly played a part as well (Emanuel is 
an imposing figure in both national and local politics and ultimately did 
win the mayoral election.). But the decision may also be thought of as 
neutral and democratic as well. The voters, and not the court, were given 
the last say. Democracy won. 
C.  The Democracy Canon: An Internal Critique 
In the previous Sections, this Article argued that the case for using the 
Democracy Canon in the Murkowski and Emanuel cases, just as a matter 
of reading the relevant texts correctly, is a tough call.
142
 There is at least a 
plausible case that the statutes and regulations at issue were in fact not 
ambiguous. This is not, of course, the same as saying that the policies 
behind the relatively straightforward readings of the texts were good; in 
fact, there is reason to think that they were not. But this is not reason 
enough to simply reread the statutes in favor of a policy we would prefer. 
The threshold test for using the Democracy Canon—indeed, any canon of 
interpretation—requires that the statute in question be ambiguous. That is 
why we resort to aids in interpretation, after all. If the statute is not 
ambiguous, and merely reflects a bad policy, then the canon never comes 
into play; at least, it should not. 
 There is a case to be made (and this Article has tried to make it) that in 
both the Murkowski and Emanuel cases, principle trumped proper statutory 
interpretation—the principle embodied in Hasen‘s Democracy Canon. But 
what if this is incorrect? What if it simply is the case that the regulations 
were ambiguous, that reasonable people could disagree about their 
meaning? Would there be a reason not to use the Democracy Canon to act 
as a tiebreaker? This is clearly the direction that Hasen wants to go; that is, 
he would like the Democracy Canon to be the default position. But there 
are reasons to refrain from using the Democracy Canon, at least in certain 
circumstances. Those circumstances apply here. 
1.  Neutrality, Again 
The Democracy Canon comes down clearly on the side of one value, 
and to that extent it can be considered non-neutral. It says: the laws that 
regulate the election frustrate, to varying degrees, the expression of the will 
of the voter. In the Murkowski case, the frustration occurred when there 
were ballots that could not be counted because the voter did not follow the 
rules about spelling Murkowski‘s name correctly.143 The court ruled that 
the better course would be to allow a ballot to be counted when voter intent 
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was clear. In the Emanuel case, allowing the voter to express his will took 
a somewhat different path. It was not about discerning the will of the voter 
for this candidate, but letting the voter have a choice of candidate.
144
 If 
Emanuel could not run, it would mean that voters could not choose 
Emanuel; their will could not be expressed in terms of a vote for this 
candidate. So in both cases, the courts were backing a certain type of 
democratic value. Let the will of the voter control, either in allowing 
ballots to be counted, or by allowing a fuller range of choices than they 
otherwise would have had. 
The case for intervening on the side of democracy is strongest when 
there is reason to believe that the regulations restricting the franchise—or 
more broadly, frustrating the intent of the voter—are deliberate, and 
deliberately partisan. It is a fact of election law (and of life) that there have 
to be rules to regulate the process; there cannot be an absence of rules. 
There has to be an order to the process, a way to discern the intent of the 
voters; otherwise, we do not have an election, we have simply a large, 
(possibly inarticulate) grunt. There have to be qualifications for voting, 
such as age restrictions. And there have to be time limitations on voting. 
The list of required and indispensable rules could go on. Will formation is 
not a ruleless affair. The rules are not merely restrictions on expressions of 
the will of the voters, they are in fact constitutive of it.
145
 Will formation is 
inevitably rule-bound. Without rules, there simply is no will of the people.  
Nor is it the case that failure to follow the rules—and the resulting 
refusal to count a voter‘s ballot or to allow a candidate to run—is a moral 
failing on the part of the voter or even the election administrator. It may 
simply be an unfortunate event. People will make mistakes in elections. 
There will inevitably be errors in tabulation by election administrators;
146
 
not every error should equally be counted as a matter of 
disenfranchisement. Further, people will miss deadlines or fail to follow 
the rules. These are not moral failings. We might speak of the fault of the 
voter, or of blaming the voter. These are perhaps unfortunate turns of 
phrase. It is probably better to say that there are rules, and sometimes the 
effect of not following those rules will be that a vote does not count. A 
restriction on the franchise is not a morally bad thing per se. There have to 
be rules, and rules will sometimes fail to be followed, and there will be 
consequences. 
It becomes a morally bad thing when we have reason to believe that it 
was intentional. If a party stacks the deck against one group of people or 
another (usually of the other party), or even worse, if an individual 
                                                                                                                     
 144. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1063–64 (Ill. 2011). 
 145. See Robert Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social 
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administrator intentionally and unfairly quashes the vote of a qualified 
voter, then we have reason to be wary. Take the case of stacked rules. It is 
true that some rules regarding photo identification will pass constitutional 
muster. But there is still the question about how best to interpret these 
laws. If there is an ambiguity as to how those laws should be enforced 
against voters, it may be best and proper to use the Democracy Canon—to 
rule that every ambiguity should be read in favor of voter enfranchisement. 
After all, the legislature had the chance—if it really wanted to—to make 
the rules clear, and clearly against members of a party or some other group. 
Moreover, their intent was in fact non-neutral in doing so. They wanted to 
restrict the vote so that their party would have an advantage. Here the 
Democracy Canon can be brought in to tip the balance in the other 
direction. It is a non-neutral move to counteract a previous, non-neutral 
move on the part of the legislature. Both moves are non-neutral in aim, and 
the effect is to cancel them out.
147
 
 But the case for reading a statute strongly in accord with the 
Democracy Canon becomes substantially weaker when the rules in place 
are neutral, that is to say, when they are neutral in aim. In cases like this, 
the court is coming in and upsetting the neutral rules of the game in favor 
of another aim. In making this point, I do not mean to make Hasen‘s point 
that there is a good to leaving some rules undisturbed, that is, not changing 
the rules in the middle of the game. This indeed could be argued. But this 
is a point that applies to neutral and non-neutral rules alike. There might be 
non-neutral rules in place, and the argument that changing them in the 
middle of the game would be bad still holds. By contrast, the point I am 
making now is that there is a problem with upsetting rules that are neutral, 
and this is what the court does when it uses the Democracy Canon to read 
an ambiguous statute to facilitate voter intent. 
 The laws in effect in both the Murkowski and Emanuel elections were 
neutral in precisely this way, so in using the Democracy Canon, the courts 
were sinning against neutrality.
148
 Because the rules for counting ballots 
(Murkowski) or for residency requirements (Emanuel) were made behind a 
veil of ignorance,
149
 they could not help but be neutral in aim, in the way 
described above. They could not have been made in a way to secure 
partisan advantage, because the legislature could not tell in advance which 
way certain rules would cut. But they had to make rules nonetheless, and 
so they set the guidelines in a certain way. Again, the rules may not be the 
                                                                                                                     
 147. There remains the possibility that a rule originally passed behind the veil of ignorance 
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 149. See supra Subsections III.B.1–2. 
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best rules; they might not even be the most efficient rules. All I am alleging 
now is that they were at least neutral rules, without the taint of partisan 
advantage. As such, by ruling on the ground of the Democracy Canon, the 
court was not countering a non-neutral statute with a non-neutral reading. 
Rather, it was ruling against a neutral statute. 
 2.  From Neutrality to Democracy 
But why should we care about neutrality? It might be thought that if 
there are bad rules, and the statute is ambiguous, then the balance should 
still favor a reading of the statute that allows more voters to vote. Even if 
the rule is non-neutral, it is wrong to fetishize neutrality; peoples‘ votes are 
not being counted, or the candidate they favor is not being allowed to run, 
all in favor of preserving a rule that, while not deliberately designed to 
restrict the choice of voters, still has that effect. Why not substitute a better 
reading? Neutrality can seem at best an empty and formal value, of little 
worth in the face of disenfranchised voters. 
Except that in this case, preserving neutrality serves to further 
democracy. For there is more than one conception of democracy; indeed, 
there are several. But for our purposes, we need only consider two. On the 
one hand, there is the idea of popular democracy, which is what the 
Democracy Canon promotes. By removing restrictions on voter choice, and 
restrictions on the full showing of voter intent, the Democracy Canon 
allows the popular will to be heard. On the other hand, there is something 
that we might call legislative democracy, or the idea that democracy is 
mediated through the acts of a legislature, whom the people have elected to 
serve them. The two conceptions of democracy are not reducible to each 
other. Legislators may enact laws that do not fit exactly with what the 
people would choose, say, if the measure were put to a popular vote. 
Legislative democracy, nonetheless, is still a form of democracy, because 
the legislators were put in place by the people to make decisions on their 
behalf. Further, at the limit, legislatures are still kept in check by elections, 
where the people can assess how well they have done on behalf of the 
people. 
By rejecting neutral rules passed by legislatures, the courts in the 
Murkowski and Emanuel cases arguably sinned not merely against 
neutrality, but against legislative democracy. They upset the will of the 
people—as expressed in the acts of the legislature—in favor of a 
hypothesized people who would vote in the next election. So when a court 
uses the Democracy Canon, it does not unambiguously support 
democracy—at least not when the rule in question is one that is neutral, 
one that we can see did not have the intent of limiting democracy.
150
 The 
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framework established by the rules in the Murkowski and Emanuel cases, 
then, was not merely a neutral one; it has fair claim to being called a 
democratic one. We elected the legislature to make rules regulating 
elections, and they did so. When the court upsets these legislative decisions 
in favor of greater popular democracy, they upset the decisions made 
democratically by the legislature. 
And the democratic costs are not merely in one direction. By ruling on 
the Democracy Canon, the court not only frustrates a previous legislative 
determination. It also prevents future democratic action, at least 
potentially. By construing the statute expansively, the court may prevent 
democratic change of the statute, in a way that would allow greater 
expression of voter intent. If the conclusion of the Emanuel litigation had 
been that Emanuel could not run, the response surely would have been to 
change the residency rule to make it clearer, so that someone in Emanuel‘s 
position could run in the future. Of course, this may make us suspect that 
the new rule is not neutral. But the legislature cannot predict what effects 
the new rule will have in the future; it may benefit Emanuel this time 
around, but next time, it may allow a Republican candidate to run, when 
otherwise he would have been prevented. Such is the nature of rules that 
are made in conditions that approximate a veil of ignorance. They can have 
unintended effects because we cannot know with certainty how different 
rules will benefit various parties. 
So I hazard the following modification to the Democracy Canon: in 
cases where rules are made behind a veil of ignorance, the presumption 
should be to read those rules strictly, that is to say, in accord with what is a 
reasonable plain-meaning interpretation of them. We should not go out of 
our way to read those rules in a way that upholds a version of popular 
democracy, at the expense of the values of legislative democracy. The 
Democracy Canon is appropriate when we think that the legislature might 
have deliberately tried to go against popular democracy. In those cases, we 
can counter a non-neutral rule with a non-neutral interpretation of that rule. 
But when the rule is neutral, we are prioritizing a certain version of 
democracy above another. Better to let the problem with the statute—if 
there is a problem—be solved through the democratic process, and not by 
judicial fiat. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Democracy Canon is a valuable tool of statutory construction, and 
Hasen has done important work in drawing attention to it. Still, it has its 
limits, which require us not so much to reject the canon as to be more 
careful about when we apply it. It does not fit all circumstances. In 
particular, it does not fit well with those circumstances where election rules 
have been drafted in a neutral way, as if behind a veil of ignorance. Those 
rules, while not perfect, deserve a greater measure of deference; courts 
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should not reinterpret them simply because they are bad rules. Indeed, 
when they do so, they go against not just neutrality, but also democracy.  
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